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The African Quest for an inter-African Jurisdiction: Looking Beyond 
the International Criminal Court versus Africa Debate 
 
In June 2014, the African Union (AU) adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol 
on the Statue of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, often referred to as the 
Malabo Protocol. The Malabo Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (ACJHR) and empowers it to try serious crimes of international concern 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Although the ACJHR with its 
criminal chamber is not yet an operational court, it has the potential to bring positive 
contributions to a continent tormented by persistent conflicts and a culture of impunity. The 
AU, whose main objective is to coordinate and intensify cooperation for development of the 
African region, presents itself as an energetic and ambitious driving force for change in the 
continent’s human rights landscape. With a renewed focus on inter-African jurisdiction, 
African states can put their ambitious plans to the test and design legal mechanisms for the 
protection of human rights that best suit the scenery of the continent. However, the 
institutional human rights landscape in Africa, comprised of a multitude of continental, sub-
regional and international courts, is already profoundly complex and multi-layered as it is and 
the prospect of an African regional court with international criminal jurisdiction portends hard 
times ahead for its global counterpart the International Criminal Court (ICC), which operates 
on behalf of the principle of universal jurisdiction (Abass 2013a, 13). A total of 34 African 
countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC and as a result it acts as a vital 
referral mechanism for criminal cases of the African region. With human rights as a relatively 
new currency on a unique and distinctive continent, there is an ongoing debate about the 
approaches that should be taken with respect to the operationalization and realization of these 
human rights norms and concepts. With new regional developments in African criminal 
justice a regime complex is emerging that has the potential to pull AU member states in 
competing directions presented by late regional ambitions and the universal system set by the 
United Nations and ICC. AU member states now stand before various paths in the realization 
of human rights and they have been involved in an ongoing discussion on Universal 
Jurisdiction and its life-form, the ICC. Through a study of the historical antecedents of human 
rights norms and regimes on the continent we can gain knowledge about the preceding events 
that sparked the region’s interest for the path of an inter-African jurisdiction. A thorough 
consideration of all the grounds for the AU’s decision to give the African Court jurisdiction 
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over international crimes will then show that the process has been motivated by other reasons 
than late anti-ICC sentiment alone. In order to provide a more in-depth look into grounds for 
an African court with international criminal jurisdiction, this study will not only examine the 
ICC versus Africa debate, it will also go beyond it. In this way, an African perspective will be 
offered that explains a larger focus on regional processes of African human rights law not 
only as a result of growing anti-ICC sentiment but it will also be argued that there is a legal 
and historical necessity for the development of an African perspective to international human 
rights law that is not necessarily meant to duplicate or impede on the work of the ICC.  
International Human Rights Law and Africa 
Studies of international human rights law find a general agreement that human rights in Africa 
are a relatively new currency on the continent (Werle & Vormbaum 2017, 4; Obi 2012, 1; 
Heyns & Killander 2006).  It was not until 9 July 2002, when the African Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) was disbanded and replaced by the AU, that the concept of human 
rights truly gained momentum and became part of an expanded mandate for the active pursuit 
of human rights norms and rules (Obi 2012, 1). The inadequate and dissatisfactory results of 
the OAU in the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa are frequently ascribed to 
the passive role the regional institution played in the transfer of legal power to make effective 
human rights mechanisms (Enonghong 2002, 197; Umozurike 2007, 181). With the adoption 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1986, a provision was made for the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The commission was inaugurated a year 
later in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and was charged with three major functions; the protection of 
human rights, the promotion of human rights and the interpretation of the African Charter 
(African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2017). In accordance with Article 58 of 
the African Charter (1986, 15), the commission is intended to deliberate on severe human 
rights violations and it draws the attention of the Assembly of the Heads of State and 
Government (the Assembly) to special cases. However, the application of this provision 
proves to be particularly problematic as any direct measures taken by the commission are to 
be kept confidential until the Assembly shall decide otherwise. This precondition deprives the 
commission from an important enforcement tool, which is the use of publicity. Due to these 
legal restrictions to its function, the commission was denied in taking an active stance in the 
expression and condemnation of extensive human rights violations. These inadequate and 
dissatisfactory practices and results of the African commission under OAU’s regulation prove 
that particularly in early formations of human rights regimes in Africa, we can witness 
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obstacles to the transfer of legal power needed to make human rights organs fulfill the duties 
they were set up to serve. Hence, with human rights as a relatively new currency on a unique 
and distinctive continent, there are questions about the approaches that should be taken with 
respect to the operationalization and realization of these human rights norms and concepts. 
International human rights norms and concepts find their historical origins in Western liberal 
traditions and discourses (Aluko 1981, 234; Goonesekere 2013, 1). The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 
represented the first global expression of what its founding fathers believed to be rights 
concerned with the dignity of all human beings. Accordingly, the first two articles of the 
declaration state that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, without 
distinction of any kind (UDHR 1948). Historically, all regional human rights systems 
emanated from these universal foundations laid by the UN and the African human rights 
system is regarded the newest of regional arrangements (Kabange Nkongolo 2008, 2; Church 
et al. 2007, 259). Despite this early universal approach to human rights, there is an ongoing 
debate among scholars on the modern concept of human rights as a Western notion (Cobbah 
2005, 309; Wai 1979, 116; Donnelly 1982). The concept has been criticized for being a 
Western construct designed to accompaniment the Western political agenda with respect to 
non-Western societies. Although the concept of human rights is gaining momentum on the 
African continent, there seems to be a gap in the literature when it comes to approaches to 
human rights from an African perspective (Cobbah 2005, 309). According to Dunstan M. Wai 
African societies have traditionally shaped and practiced human rights according to own 
classical conceptions of rights and freedoms that should be protected within society. 
"Traditional African attitudes, beliefs, institutions, and experiences sustained the 'view that 
certain rights should be upheld against alleged necessities of state'” (Wai 1980, p. 116). These 
traditional African adaptations on human rights are often not translated in modern human 
rights policies of states. On 21 October 1986, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights entered into force. With the African Charter in place, AU member states openly 
reaffirmed “their adherence to the principle of human and people’s rights and freedoms 
contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments adopted by the Organization 
of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the United Nations” (African 
Charter 1986, 15). Hereby AU member states turn to UN human rights norms and practices 
for guidance as they create human rights instruments that are unique to the continent. 
However, the danger lies in an over-reliance on Western-oriented human rights concepts and 
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norms as this leaves smaller room for approaches from an African perspective and this might 
contribute to an ill-fitted operationalization of human rights.  
At its thirteenth ordinary session in July 2009, the Assembly of the AU requested the 
Commission “in consultation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to examine the implications of the 
Court being empowered to try serious crimes of international concern such as genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, which would be complementary to national 
jurisdiction and processes for fighting impunity” (AU Assembly 2009, Ordinary Meeting 
XIII). The request resulted in the endorsement of the Malabo Protocol in June 2014, 
extending the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) and 
empowering it to try internationally codified crimes. It is commonly assumed that the 
international fall-out over al-Bashir has motivated the AU to start a process of establishing an 
African Court with jurisdiction over international crimes (Abass 2013b, 28; Aja Agwu 2014, 
40; du Plessis 2012, 3; Murungu 2011, 3). More so than other parts of the world, the Africa 
continent finds itself in a significant period of perceivable dissent towards the ICC. The 2003 
violent outbreak in Darfur and the United Nations and ICC response to the conflict that led to 
a warrant of arrest against Sudanese President al-Bashir, is often seen as a breaking point in 
ICC – Africa relations. Therefore, the AU’s call for an inter-African criminal jurisdiction is 
considered to be a direct aftereffect of the international fall-out over al-Bashir. However, this 
perspective would suggest that the Malabo Protocol purely represents an anti-ICC move on 
behalf of the AU. The court has been the subject of increased criticism as the far-reaching 
universal jurisdiction of the ICC has never produced an investigation or prosecution outside of 
Africa. This growing criticism raises concerns whether the new African court is merely meant 
to serve as a substitute of ICC activities.  
Research Question and Methodology 
In light of the discussed developments and growing speculations about the motives behind the 
AU’s call for an inter-African jurisdiction, the research question arises: ‘What have been the 
preceding events that sparked the region's interest for the path of an inter-African 
jurisdiction?’ This study will show that it would be inaccurate to assume that the Malabo 
Protocol represents the start of a process to substitute ICC activities in the course of time. 
Although the grounds for the AU’s decision to set up an own regional court with a criminal 
chamber are set in the ICC versus Africa debate, an in-depth analysis of the debate will 
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explain that there is a need for an African perspective in international human rights law in 
ways that go beyond the ICC versus Africa debate. Thus, the hypothesis of this research is: 
‘The regional process towards an inter-African jurisdiction has not been motivated by late 
anti-ICC sentiment alone’. For the purpose of testing this hypothesis, the first chapter will 
examine the seemingly unproblematic character of ICC practices in relationship to the African 
continent through qualitative research methods. A qualitative analysis of the principles on 
which the ICC is build will provide an African perspective that explains why the ICC’s 
international practice of human rights, despite its uncomplicated personality on paper, does 
not run without implications and in light of the African continent leads to an increase in 
tensions and critiques. The analysis will primarily include views on the ICC from an African 
perspective that become increasingly complex as the court finds itself and its practices caught 
between the development of international and national human rights norms. Moreover, in the 
case of Africa, these views are subjected to deep-seated anti-imperialist sentiments that are 
reinforced by the lack of ICC investigations and prosecutions outside of the continent. As a 
result, the previous positive stance of the AU Assembly towards the ICC has changed to 
stance of increased awareness on the abusive trades of the court.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why much of Africa has become 
critical of the ICC and its abusive practices, the second chapter will discuss African cases of 
universal jurisdiction. These cases are narrowed down to three separate case studies on Côte 
d’Ivoire, Chad and Sudan that will be subjected to a qualitative research approach. By diving 
into the context of the different conflicts and ways in which international human rights law 
has been applied, we can gain a deeper understanding of the AU’s late ambitions to take a 
regional approach to human rights. The three cases studies will be analyzed in a qualitative 
manner that highlights critical views with respect to the ICC from an African perspective. The 
ICC trial against Ivorian ex-President Gbagbo has been the topic of much controversy, was 
viewed as one-sided and failed to hold all responsible parties involved in the conflict 
accountable for serious human rights violations. The 2010-2011 post-election outbreak of 
violence in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in the arrest of ex-President Gbago, while the sitting 
President Alassane Ouattara, who also engaged heavily in the conflict and holds responsible 
for several crimes against humanity, has so far been exempt from persecution. The case 
proves that international arrangements and prosecutorial selectivity can become 
uncomfortable and the focus of increased controversy. The second case revolves around 
Kenya, which further reveals that the international practice of the ICC and its principles does 
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not run without implications. The court has been skeptical of Kenya’s domestic investigations 
and prosecutions its application of the prosecutor’s proprio motu power represents a direct 
threat to the national sovereignty of African states in the eyes of the Kenyan government. The 
last case that will be examined is the case of Sudan. It is commonly assumed that the 
international fall-out over al-Bashir has been the direct motivation for the AU to start a 
process of establishing an African Court with jurisdiction over international crimes. 
Although these African cases of universal jurisdiction have undoubtedly been a catalyst for 
the AU’s call for an inter-African criminal jurisdiction, the need for a regional approach to 
human rights law in Africa should also be explained beyond the ICC versus Africa debate. If 
we neglect the motivations for an inter-African jurisdiction that lie beyond the growing anti-
ICC sentiment, the danger lies in assuming that the Malabo Protocol represents the start of a 
process to substitute ICC activities in the course of time. The third chapter will therefore look 
beyond the ICC versus Africa debate through a qualitative analysis of the historical 
antecedents that sparked the region’s interest for the path of an inter-African jurisdiction. A 
thorough descriptive, qualitative analysis of Africa’s post-colonial history and consequential 
issues with democratic consolidation will then show that the process has been motivated by 
other reasons than late anti-ICC sentiment alone. Instead there has been a historical necessity 
for human rights law to continue its natural development, for example through the expansion 
of international crimes that are peculiar to the region such as crimes that defy the process of 
democratic consolidation on the continent. In contrast to the cases of Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya 
and Sudan, the case of Chad will then be discussed as it represented the first time a country in 
the Global South exercised universal jurisdiction. It is often argued that the case of Hissène 
Habré paved the way to the idea of establishing an African Criminal Chamber. The case study 
on Habré will take the shape of a descriptive analysis that highlights the lingering obstacles to 
the regional practice of criminal jurisdiction in Africa. In light of these concerns, it will then 
be argued that African human rights practices require further development for the 
consolidation of made commitments to human rights norms and rules. The Rome Statute 
leaves room for such developments without the need to duplicate or impede on the work of 
the ICC. It is therefore of vital importance that we see beyond the ICC versus Africa debate 
when looking for an explanation for modern human rights developments in Africa. 
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Chapter 1. The International Criminal Court versus Africa Debate 
 
In October 2016, AU member states Burundi, South Africa and Gambia initiated a process to 
leave the International Criminal Court (ICC). As President Pierre Nkurunziza officially 
appended his signature to the Burundian’s decision to pull out of the Rome Statute, an 
unprecedented process of withdrawal from ICC activities had been set into motion. Burundi’s 
announcement followed The United Nations Human Rights Council declaration to set up a 
commission of inquiry into human rights abuses since Nkurunziza’s re-election in April, 
2015. South Africa soon followed in Burundi’s footsteps and approached the UN Secretary-
General in absence of parliamentary consent with plans of its own to leave the ICC. Four days 
later, Gambia would be the third African state within that same month willing to disengage 
from the ICC. The announcements were met with public expressions of concern from activists 
and ICC officials that called for the continued support of the ICC as a crucial court of last 
resort. The president of the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC, Sidiki Kaba, stated that 
“The withdrawal from the Statute by a State Party would represent a setback in the fight 
against impunity and the efforts towards the objective of universality of the Statute” 
(Assembly of States Parties 2016). States Parties to the Rome Statute were requested to 
openly express their concerns in the Assembly and to keep the withdrawing states engaged in 
a dialogue. While Burundi’s plans of withdrawal came as less of a surprise, due to its previous 
inadequate stance towards the promotion and development of human rights and 
accountability, South Africa’s withdrawal had been much more noteworthy. Unlike the other 
withdrawing states, South Africa has never been under investigation by the ICC and the 
‘rainbow nation’ has been a leading figure for justice and reconciliation on the continent. 
Therefore, the South African expression to explore its exit options, forms a momentous 
turnabout in ICC-Africa relations that sharpens the ICC versus Africa debate. The ICC 
however, is a crucial court of last resort that functions as a complementary court that is not 
meant to replace national courts. Ever since the founding treaty of the ICC, the Rome Statue, 
entered into force on July 1, 2002, African states have increasingly supported the ICC as the 
responsible court for international criminal accountability. This chapter will discuss the 
principles under which the ICC acts ever since its establishment. Despite the initial 
unproblematic character of these principles, it will then be argued that the international 
practice of universality does not run without implications and in light of the African continent 
can lead to an increase in tensions and critiques.  
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1.1 The Core Principles of the International Criminal Court  
The core principles of the ICC, as formulated under the Rome Statute, have been the subject 
of extensive studies in international law. The ICC was established in July 1998 with the 
adoption of the Rome Statute and ever since it acts in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity and the principle of universal jurisdiction. The principle of complementarity 
entails that the ICC will only prosecute when an individual or state is unwilling or unable to 
do so. This would imply that the state in which the crime occurs has the first responsibility to 
take the case to its national court and the ICC will only step in place after a national court has 
proved to be unable or unwilling to prosecute. With the principle of universal jurisdiction in 
place, a case can be brought to any court that is willing to prosecute regardless of the place 
where the crime occurred and the nationality or place of residence of the perpetrator. Due to 
the transparent and unproblematic nature of the principles it has been challenging to entice a 
compelling political debate on the subject (Philippe 2006, 376; Steiner 2004, 200). Many 
studies on the principle of universal jurisdiction take a descriptive approach and focus their 
research on the exercise, application and historical origin of the principle. This descriptive 
approach is often accompanied by a positive outlook and strong confidence in state courts and 
universal efforts to achieve criminal accountability and break cultures of impunity. With the 
principles in place, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole” (Rome Statute of the ICC 2002, 3). The 
crimes that are considered the most serious and of concern to the international community as a 
whole are narrowed down to; the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Advocates of universal jurisdiction often find that there is still a substantial fight ahead with 
respect to persistent cases of impunity in domestic courts. Domestic courts with lower 
developed hindrances to impunity and lacking judicial tools often struggle to successfully 
bring cases of severe human rights violations to justice. Therefore, the prevention and 
punishment of the most serious crimes relies on both international and domestic prosecution. 
In the event of domestic circumstances that allow perpetrator of severe crimes to go 
unpunished, the ICC will play a complementary role that is meant to deter perpetrators of 
crimes and protect the victims that otherwise would be left behind (Roth 2001, 150). 
The principle of universal jurisdiction derives its authority and strength from the unlawful and 
inhumane character of war crimes (Joyner 1996, 155; Cowles 1945, 194). An international 
community dedicated to the future prevention of war crimes started taking shape after the end 
of the Second World War. The Second World War had been the deadliest war in human 
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history and in order to prevent such a devastating war from ever occurring again, the 
international community increasingly adopted a common, universal stance towards war 
crimes. Studies on war crimes have shown that these crimes more often than not occur in 
turbulent and violent environments that lack suitable jurisdiction and capable courts (Joyner 
1996, 162). In the heat of battle, the parties involved are often not subjected to humanitarian 
restraints or familiar with recognized laws of war. Armed military forces unfamiliar with 
humanitarian customs and procedures add an exceptionally hazardous and unpredictable 
element to armed conflicts that may result in grave human rights violations as a result of 
insufficient calculations and planning. Early research on war crimes had already found that 
these type of crimes usually occur in states with an ineffective police and law apparatus unfit 
to administrate and execute the persecution and prosecution of war criminals (Cowles 1945, 
194). This would imply that a deterioration of state control over its law enforcement 
mechanisms lays fertile soils for potential war crimes. However, armed military forces are not 
the only party capable of committing crimes in times of war. Regardless of one’s function, 
every actor involved in an armed conflict is capable to resort to crimes against humanity. 
Hence, no actor that engages in war crimes should be able to claim immunity and resist a fair 
trial. However it can become extremely difficult for a domestic court to prosecute a criminal 
that occupies a high political office, such as a country’s head of state or commander of chief, 
if such an actor makes a claim of immunity based on its political position. With the ICC in 
place, any actor who has committed war crimes can be brought to trial under the principle of 
universal jurisdiction and complementarity whereby claims of immunity and powerless 
national courts no longer form a barrier in the realization of justice. 
Although the core principles of the Rome Statute receive widespread support, there has been 
an emerging debate on their growing controversies (Philippe 2006, 376). With the principles 
in place, the ICC is permitted to interfere in the domestic affairs of a signatory state of the 
Rome Statute, leading to tensions between international criminal jurisdiction and state 
sovereignty. The principles are often regarded forceful instruments that work for the 
pragmatic exercise of universal jurisdiction (Philippe 2006, 376). Furthermore, while the 
principles facilitate the global fight against impunity, there are still various international 
crimes that are not brought to justice. Despite made commitments to universal jurisdiction by 
signatory states of the Rome Statute, it still occurs that states refuse to extradite or prosecute 
criminals that have committed severe international crimes. It would seem that these states did 
not foresee the obstacles that the regular practice of politics and diplomacy would pose to 
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their commitment and exercise of universal jurisdiction (Philippe 2006, 398). Due to these 
problems with the implementation of the principles, there has been an increased focus on the 
constraints and controversies surrounding universal jurisdiction. It is argued that the principle 
of universal jurisdiction greatly contributes to the fight against impunity in theory, while in 
practice its heightened use could lead to abuse and instability (Kissinger 2001, 86). In light of 
these concerns, the principle must not borrow itself as a tool to settle political scores. 
Furthermore, the successful translation of the theoretical principles as formulated in the Rome 
Statute to actual implementation at the state level is dependent on the input and motivation of 
involved states. Without the right political or diplomatic incentives it becomes less probable 
for a prosecution with the endorsement of the principle of universal jurisdiction to materialize, 
even in the presence of strong pressure coming from civil society actors (Steiner 2004, 227). 
1.2 Growing Controversy: The International Criminal Court and Prosecution Discretion 
Modern studies on universality indicate that African states have come to be increasingly 
critical of ICC operations (Jalloh 2010, 2; Geneuss 2009, 1). Yet despite the increase in 
tensions between African states and the court, African leaders have initially been very 
supportive of the ICC’s fight against impunity and have widely backed the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government shares the ICC’s 
concerns with respect to impunity as African criminals have too long been able to escape 
accountability for the serious crimes they committed. However, as the number of court 
interventions on the African continent grew, the principle of universal jurisdiction was 
progressively viewed as a concealed stratagem of Western states to threaten the sovereignty of 
African states. The court has been skeptical of domestic investigations and prosecutions in 
Africa and has shown little confidence in their abilities, leaving less room for the principle of 
complementarity to take effect (Roestenburg-Morgan 2013, 4). As a result, the AU Assembly 
has changed its supportive stance on universal jurisdiction to an increased awareness on the 
abusive traits of the principle. In addition to these developments, The AU assembly is 
increasingly concerned with the negative impact of abusive court practices against African 
criminals with respect to stability within the region. The Assembly has argued that “the abuse 
and misuse of indictments against African leaders have a destabilizing effect that will 
negatively impact on the political, social and economic development of States and their ability 
to conduct international relations” (Assembly of the AU 2008, 1). In light of these concerns 
the AU Assembly has requests an urgent meeting with the European Union to discuss their 
concerns and to come to a long-term solution for the problem (Assembly of the AU 2008, 2). 
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AU member states repeatedly felt to have been the subject of unfair uses of universal 
jurisdiction by national Western courts. The amount of charges against states of the Global 
South are a sharp contrast to the small number of charges against criminals in Anglo-Saxon 
parts of the world (Jalloh 2010, 13). This asymmetry in charges however, can partly be 
explained by dissimilarities in the type of crimes that are committed by actors of different 
regions. Yet, there is a deeper underlying cause for imbalances in cases of universal 
jurisdiction. With the start of the war on terror in 2011, there have been several cases, such as 
Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq that involved the engagement of Western officials in 
war crimes. In response to the crimes committed, these cases were met with lengthy 
confinements and arrests but not under the initiative of Global South states. In practice, we 
therefore witness that universal jurisdiction is exercised by developed states at the expense of 
lesser developed countries. It has not yet occurred, that a domestic court of a developing 
country exercised universal jurisdiction in response to a severe crime committed by a Western 
state and its officials (Jalloh 2010, 56). Furthermore, while the United States (US) has been a 
leading nation in global politics, it has not ratified the Rome Statute and hereby finds itself in 
the company of countries including India, China and Saudi Arabia. The absence of a complete 
and worldwide ratification of the Rome Statute has its implications for the fairness of ICC 
practices as it leads to asymmetry and irregularities in international law. The jurisdiction of 
the ICC is limited to crimes committed by a national of a signatory state or crimes committed 
on the territory of a signatory state (Goldsmith 2003, 91). This implies that leaders of non-
signatory states that are engaged in human rights violations within their domestic sphere, are 
invulnerable to universal jurisdiction even if they visit a signatory state of the Rome Statute. 
As the US has never ratified the Rome Statute, it is therefore invulnerable to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction if it were to engage in human rights violations within its domestic sphere. 
There have been many cases where political imparities have affected efficient ICC decision-
making with respect to Western states. Because the ICC depends on the support and 
cooperation of states for its successful operation and to secure of the custody of persons 
wanted for trial, it is contingent on political motivation (Akande 2004, 432). In the global 
world power matters and states with the most power find themselves in a position where they 
can undermine the court and limit its reach. So far, the US has been the only major power that 
has adopted a policy of active marginalization. Between 2001 and 2005 the US openly 
discouraged other states from supporting the ICC through the use of diplomatic efforts (Bosco 
2014, 178). This brings forth concerns about the United Nations Security Council which 
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enabled the US, as a veto power, to pass several resolutions that limited ICC jurisdiction 
during its war on terror (Bosco 2014, 178). In this time, the other Security Council members 
with veto power, including China, Russia, India and Japan, chose the path of passive 
marginalization whereby the legitimacy of the court was not directly undermined, but its 
ability to operate was systematically limited through reduced state funding and resource 
contribution. Due to the ICC’s dependence on the support and cooperation of states, the court 
has chosen not to challenge powerful states (Bosco 2014, 185). This became particularly 
apparent in the court’s initial years when it avoided situations involving powerful states. 
While the court had full jurisdiction to conduct an investigation in the US-led Iraq war, 
Afghanistan and Colombia, these cases never materialized.  
In order to avoid tense situations with powerful states, the ICC directed its focus on cases of 
internal violence and opened its initial investigations in African states such as Congo and 
Uganda. However this trend is still apparent in ICC decision making and operations today. 
There have been many studies on the 2003 US and United Kingdom-led Iraq invasion and war 
in Iraq as a form of state crime that has never been investigated by the ICC. While the 
invasion of Iraq has often been promoted as a legitimate move in response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the US and human rights violations by the then President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, 
there is now a strong case that the invasion was an act of aggression in violation of the United 
Nations Charter and international law (Kramer & Michalowski 2005, 446; Maersheimer & 
Walt 2003, 51). During the US political campaign in search of support for an invasion in Iraq, 
the Bush administration warned the international community of connections between Saddam 
Hussein and Al Qaida, the terrorist organization behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US 
(Waxman 2004, 23). Despite doubts of intelligence agencies, President Bush claimed in 
November 2002 that Saddam Hussein is “a threat because he is dealing with Al Qaida … 
[and] an Al Qaida-type network trained and armed by Saddam could attack America and not 
leave one fingerprint” (White House 2002). As the connections between Hussein and al Qaida 
remained questionable, later evidence revealed that the Bush administration was never in 
possession of data to support their claims (Corn 2003, 93). The Bush administration counted 
on Article 51 of the UN Charter to find a legal basis for its invasion based on the right to self-
defense. To strengthen the legal basis for an Iraq invasion, the US adopted a new National 
Security Strategy by claiming it had the right to attack another nation if it formed a potential 
threat. Finally, in the absence of UN Security Council approval and with the support of the 
United Kingdom, the US invaded Iraq on the claim that Hussein was in possession of 
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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Later evidence revealed that WMDs were never 
found in Iraq, and Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom supported the 
invasion, knowing no evidence was found of WMDs. This case is just one of many examples 
where powerful states escape impunity due to the ICC’s avoidance of entanglements with 
these states. 
In light of the ICC strategy to avoid entanglements with powerful states, Western nations are 
rarely punished for their deeds. As a result, all the cases under investigation or prosecution by 
the ICC are in Africa. This selectivity in ICC jurisdiction contributes to an increase in anti-
ICC sentiment on the African continent. In addition to this selectivity in ICC cases, the cases 
under investigation or prosecution by the ICC do not always tell the full story and focus on 
African governments without taking into account other contributing factors that help to fuel 
human rights violations in these countries. The next chapter will discuss the African cases 
under investigation by the ICC. One of these cases revolves around the ICC dispute over 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. There have been two international reports on violence in 
Darfur, a region in the West of Sudan. After the 2003 violent outbreak in Darfur, the United 
Nations set up a commission on Darfur and in 2008 the ICC followed suit with its own report 
on the crisis and issued a warrant of arrest against al-Bashir. However, the reports mainly 
focus on the post-2003 conflict and pay little attention to the historical antecedents of the 
conflict that in its two preceding decades took the shape of a civil war. With the ICC case 
against al-Bashir the spotlight has been on the Sudanese government while the role of other 
actors involved in the militarization of the preceding civil war has been largely overlooked. 
The following chapter will provide a historical analysis of the conflict and discusses the role 
of international powers and their global context in intensifying the Darfur conflict. With the 
analysis of two other cases under investigation by the ICC, the case of Chad and Cote 
D’Ivoire, we can further our understanding of recent developments in African international 
law and the AU’s decision to give the African Court jurisdiction over international crimes.  
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Chapter 2. Universal Jurisdiction in Practice: African Cases 
 
Ever since the establishment of the AU, the concept of human rights has truly gained 
momentum and became part of an expanded mandate for the active pursuit of human rights 
norms and rules. In this pursuit, AU member states have continuously reaffirmed their 
rejection of human rights violations and they have made commitments to answer the legal 
obligations as codified under the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the far-reaching 
jurisdiction of the ICC has never produced an investigation or prosecution outside the African 
continent. And while there have been cases fit for ICC investigation where Western leaders 
engaged in human rights violations, they never materialized in order to avoid entanglements 
with powerful states. The cases that did materialize often focus on African governments and 
human rights violations by African leaders. This chapter will discuss three of these cases in 
order to provide a more in-depth look into the issues these African cases are accompanied by. 
An African perspective will be offered that explains growing anti-ICC sentiment and a larger 
focus on regional processes of international criminal jurisdiction in Africa. The case of Côte 
d’Ivoire will expose increased tensions and complications in ICC – Africa relations and 
explains the growth of criticism in Africa. The case of Chad represented a watershed moment 
in international justice as this would be the first time a country in the Global South would 
exercise universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, with a case study of Sudan and the warrant of 
arrest against al-Bashir it will be argued that the ICC’s focus on the Sudanese leader fails to 
take into account other contributing factors to the intensification of human rights violations in 
Darfur. As a result, AU member states repeatedly felt to have been the subject of unfair uses 
of universal jurisdiction by national Western courts. The ICC cases produced international 
outcries and the AU’s call for an inter-African criminal jurisdiction is often seen as a direct 
aftereffect of the international fall-out over al-Bashir. 
2.1 The Case of Côte d’Ivoire and the Obstacle of Impartial Justice 
Following the 2010-2011 post-election outbreak of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, the ICC brought 
the country’s former President Laurent Gbagbo and Youth minister Charles Blé Goudé to 
trial. The political leaders were suspected of criminal responsibility for crimes against 
humanity, including murder and rape, persecution of enemies of the state and other inhumane 
acts committed in Côte d’Ivoire between December 2010 and April 2011 (Amnesty 
International 2016). After years of unrest and internal divisions the presidential elections of 
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2010 were seen as an important democratic step to bring legitimacy to the country’s political 
system and start a process of peace and reconciliation (Malu 2016, 832). After the second 
round of presidential elections were held, former President Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular 
Front (IPF) and Alassane Ouattara of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire - African 
Democratic Rally (RDR) were the two remaining candidates (Sidibé 2013, 1). However, 
tensions between the two candidates soon led to an electoral dispute and an armed 
confrontation followed between military forces loyal to Gbagbo and Republican forces in 
support of Ouattara. Despite efforts of the AU and Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) to come to a solution while persuading Gbagbo to accept his defeat, 
hostilities between the two candidates continued. Together with the European Union (EU) and 
the US the AU and ECOWAS dismissed Gbagbo’s claim of victory as the Independent 
Electoral Commission further declared that it was Ouattara who received a majority in 
electoral votes. Regardless of international pressures, Gbagbo was sworn into office by the 
Constitutional Court in December 2010. In response, Ouattara formed a government of his 
own that operated from the Abidjan Golf Hotel (Malu 2016, 833). A few months later and 
with the support of France, the Ivorian movement against Gbagbo, Forces Nouvelles, 
launched a military offensive which led to the arrest of Gbagbo in April 2011. 
With its active practice of universal jurisdiction in West-Africa, the ICC plays a deterring role 
in Côte d’Ivoire. The case against Gbagbo and Goudé works to promote accountability for 
serious crimes and respect for international law. Furthermore, ICC involvement in Côte 
d’Ivoire has contributed to the de-escalation of violence (Malu 2016, 51). Yet, the impact of 
the ICC in Côte d’Ivoire is undermined by a growing perception of the court’s prosecutorial 
strategy as one characterized by partiality. The ICC prosecution solely targets crimes 
committed by one side of the conflict, that of former President Gbagbo, and fails to examine 
the context of the post-election violence in its entirety. The court has refrained from 
prosecuting crimes committed by the current President Ouattara and the republican forces 
loyal to him. In the aftermath of the post-election crisis, Ouattara received unconditional 
international support, allowing Côte d’Ivoire to quickly recover its economy through the 
cancellation of debts and provision of new loans (Koepf 2013, 1). However, international 
pressure on Ouattara has thickened as a result of late developments in Côte d’Ivoire’s 
transitional justice. The Ivorian judicial system has so far only prosecuted forces loyal to 
Gbagbo while largely ignoring forces loyal to Ouattara responsible for war crimes and likely 
crimes against humanity (Wells 2012). In response, various human rights organizations have 
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expressed their concerns and accused the Ivorian government and national courts of 
administering ‘victor’s justice’, which forms a barrier to the achievement of political 
reconciliation in the absence of justice for victims of both sides.  
With the exception of Uganda and some qualification among African states, much of the 
international community endorsed Ouattara as Côte d’Ivoire’s legal victor of the presidential 
elections while rejecting Gbabgo’s claim of victory (Cook 2011, 11). The international 
community has responded to the post-election crisis both through multilateral and bilateral 
efforts in an attempt to obligate Gbagbo to concede defeat. These efforts include diplomatic 
sanctions against the Gbagbo government, economic sanctions such as a freeze of funds and 
other financial assets and the threat of military intervention. In December 2010, ECOWAS 
suspended the participation of Côte d’Ivoire in the sub-regional economic organization for an 
undetermined period of time. The AU soon gave strength to the ECOWAS decision by further 
suspending Côte d’Ivoire’s participation in all AU activities “until such a time the 
democratically-elected President effectively assumes State power” (AU Peace and Security 
Council 2010, 1). However, opposition to Gbagbo’s persistent and unjust claim to power not 
only came from within the African region. In a press release that same month, The UN 
Security Council members called on the Ivorian Stakeholders to show “respect for the 
outcome of the presidential election as recognized by the Economic Community of West 
African states (ECOWAS) and the African Union” (UN Security Council 2010). Later that 
month, the 192 member states of the UN General Assembly officially recognized Ouattara as 
the legitimate President of Côte d’Ivoire  and through an anonymous vote the Assembly 
accepted the diplomats submitted by Ouattara as the sole and official representatives of the 
country (Cook 2011, 13). 
As a result of the unconditional support of the international community for the Ouattara camp, 
fear exists that leaders of the Ouattara administration will continue to engage in violence and 
human rights abuses with impunity. The Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), Côte 
d’Ivoire’s military created by decree of President Ouattara in March 2011, were faced with 
the daunting task of uniting fighters of both sides of the post-election conflict after the arrest 
of Gbagbo a month later. Remaining suspicion among FRCI soldiers and lingering loyalties to 
Gbagbo further complicate the process of peace and reconciliation as an effective state 
security apparatus seems remote. Furthermore, the Ivorian government’s prevention of a coup 
détat in June 2012 produced concerns about the way Ouattara’s administration framed the 
issue. In an conducted by Human Rights Watch an Ivorian diplomat stated: “the language they 
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use is very concerning: ‘eradication,’ ‘terrorism,’ ‘clean the country up’. They’re so 
convinced they’re right … that they’ve decided to put reconciliation aside” (Human Rights 
Watch 2012). This type of language is quite similar to that of the Gbagbo government in the 
aftermath of the 2002 coup d’état when the rebellion was accused of committing ‘foreign 
terrorist attack’ (International Crisis Group 2003, 4). In light of these concerns, the credibility 
of the ICC as an impartial and independent court has become subjected to growing criticism 
in Africa. 
2.2 The Case of Kenya and the Implications of the Principle of Complementarity  
Following the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya, a significant outbreak of violence erupted 
in the most stable country of Africa. International observers were shocked as the conflict 
resulted in the deaths of approximately 1000 people and over a hundred thousand people were 
displaced (Sriram & Brown 2012, 219). Two years later, ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo commenced a formal investigations into the post-election violence. The ICC stepped 
into place as the Kenyan domestic court seemed unable or unwilling to commence a trial 
against the senior politicians and businessmen responsible for the crimes against humanity 
that occurred. Hereby, the ICC stepped in under the principle of complementarity, leaving the 
first responsibility up to Kenya to take the case to its national court. The investigation of 
Kenya represented a first time case initiated by the ICC prosecutor, rather than a state referral 
or a United Nations Security Council request. However, the case has been one of increased 
tensions between the African state and the ICC as the Kenyan authorities challenged the 
admissibility of the ICC case. In response, the ICC dismissed Kenyan demands for more time 
and space so it could investigate the controversial post-election incidents without interference 
of the Hague-based court. The court has been skeptical of Kenya’s domestic investigations 
and prosecutions and has shown little confidence in their abilities, leaving less room for the 
principle of complementarity to take effect. The official Judgment of the ICC Appeals 
Chamber on Kenya stated that: “If a State challenges the admissibility of a case, it must 
provide the Court with evidence with a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value 
that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the case. It is not sufficient merely to assert 
that investigations are ongoing” (ICC Appeals Chamber 2011, 3). 
The case presents an opportunity to examine the pressure African states can experience due to 
the ICC’s impatient practice of the principle of complementarity. The principle of 
complementarity regulates a healthy, coexistent relationship between the ICC and national 
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courts. But in the case of Kenya the principle raised several issues of law and procedure. 
Before the Hague-based court, Kenya expressed that it was willing and able to commence 
investigations and a subsequent trial. Hereby Kenya argued that its domestic justice was 
superior to international justice instead of the other way around. In the eyes of Kenyan 
authorities its national court had become complementary to the ICC, which directly threatened 
the national sovereignty of the African state. In a formal application on behalf of the 
Government of the Republic of Kenya submitted to the ICC, Kenyan authorities stressed that 
the newly adopted constitution of 2010 significantly strengthened its national trial processes 
through the comprehensive reform of Kenya’s judicial system. In its appeal, the Kenyan 
government argued that the case was being investigated by the national authorities 
(Government of the Republic of Kenya 2011, 19). However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
determined that the mere statement that ‘the case is being investigated’ did not provide a solid 
ground for an admissibility claim. Instead, it referred to Article 17 of the Rome Statute and 
stated that “for a case to be admissible before the Court, a national jurisdiction must be 
investigating the same person and for the same conduct as in the case already before the 
court” (ICC Appeals Chamber 2011, 9). And so, the Rome Statute became the subject of 
diverse theoretical interpretations that were utilized in a battle of different legal interpretations 
between the ICC and the government of Kenya to bring the case of 2007 post-election 
violence to justice.  
The ICC’s application of the prosecutor’s proprio motu power to initiate an investigation into 
the situation in Kenya, has provided the court with more certainty in its international fight 
against impunity. Instead of awaiting for a national court to start sluggish proceedings against 
individuals within its territory that have engaged in human rights abuses, the United Nations 
Security Council can refer a criminal case to the ICC. However, the ICC’s involvement in 
Kenya takes place in an environment of heightened suspicion under African leaders (Sing’Oei 
2010, 17). In this environment, The ICC is increasingly seen as a Western instrument of 
domination that acts at the expense of African states (Sing’Oei 2010, 17). Furthermore, The 
ICC has been skeptical of Kenya’s domestic investigations and prosecutions and has denied 
Kenya’s request for more time. As a result, the principle of complementarity did not 
materialize. The case of Kenya hereby proves that despite the uncomplicated nature of the 
core principle of the ICC on paper, its international practice does not run without implications 
and in light of the African continent it can lead to an increase in tensions and critiques.  
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2.3 The Case of Sudan and the International Fall-Out over al-Bashir 
On July 14, 2008, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo called for the warrant of arrest 
against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. The United Nations Commission on Darfur, that 
was set up three years earlier, presented the prosecutor with sufficient evidence against al-
Bashir for ten counts of serious crimes in international law. According to the ICC press 
release on the day of the proposed arrest warrant “the Prosecution evidence shows that Al 
Bashir masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part the Fur, Masalit 
and Zaghawa groups, on account of their ethnicity” (ICC Press Release 2008). Based on the 
evidence provided by statements from victims, eyewitnesses and government officials, the 
prosecutor was convinced that the intent of the Sudanese President was genocide. The 
government of Sudan had not been cooperative in the distribution of humanitarian aid to 
ravaged villages and blocked food supplies to Darfur (Falligant 2010, 740). Ongoing violence 
between government forces, militias and rebel groups led to the internal displacement of 2.7 
million people and the number of people in Darfur in need of humanitarian aid grew to 
approximately 4.7 million (Security Council Report 2008). Furthermore, the Sudanese 
government was held responsible for bomb attacks on its civilian population, war crimes 
whereby individuals were killed in their sleep, mass executions, rape incidents and pollution 
of water supplies with corpses (Falligant 2010, 740). The case against Al-Bashir was a 
watershed moment in universal jurisdiction as it represented the first time a sitting head of 
state was prosecuted. As a result, the case was met with outcries from several states that were 
mainly from the Global South, which had a delaying effect on the release of the arrest 
warrant. However, despite increased global rejections to the prosecution of a head of state, the 
ICC pre-trial chamber issued the warrant of arrest for al-Bashir on March 4, 2009. The pre-
trial chamber gave strength to its decision by stating: “Omar Al Bashir’s official capacity as a 
sitting Head of State does not exclude his criminal responsibility, nor does it grant him 
immunity against prosecution before the ICC” (ICC Press Release 2009). 
The warrant of arrest against al-Bashir has been met with growing opposition and there have 
been several regional organizations that pushed for a deferral. The AU was accompanied by 
the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of Islamic Conference in its 
campaign for a binding Security Council deferral (Falligant 2010, 744). The AU argued that 
the warrant of arrest undermined the peace process in Darfur and have a negative effect on the 
already fragile foundations for stability in the country. In the mid-1980s a civil war erupted in 
Sudan and for the next two decades Darfur would be the scene of spiraling violence. The 
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international focus on Sudanese government officials and their corresponding statistics and 
casualty figures makes the accusations against al-Bashir on account of serious international 
crimes seem self-explanatory. Yet in spite of striking evidence of human rights violations by 
Sudanese government officials, the legal proceedings against al-Bashir seems to fail to take 
into account the historical causes of the conflict and the contemporary political climate and 
sub-regional context in which the crimes occurred. This becomes particularly evident when 
we compare two international reports published on the Darfur case and their different 
outcomes whether the Sudanese government had committed the crime of genocide. The first 
international report on violence in Darfur after the insurgency of 2003 had been published by 
the United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in 2005. The report 
concluded that “the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide” as their 
policies proved to have no intent of murdering civilians in such a systematic and widespread 
manner that it acquired the legal features of extermination as a crime against humanity (UN 
Commission on Darfur 2005, 132). The report hereby examined the context of the violence 
and concluded that the factor “genocidal intent” was missing as the government intended to 
drive civilians away from their homes through planned attacks as part of a counter-insurgency 
strategy (Mamdani 2010, 3). However, when the case was referred to the ICC to commence 
legal proceedings, the prosecutor charged the Sudanese President with genocide. Hereby, the 
ICC report on Darfur focused on the figures and casualty outcomes that the violence 
produced, instead of the context in which the violence occurred (Mamdani 2010, 3). 
The genocide label has been highly politicized and as a result it is susceptible to abuses 
(Herman & Peterson 2010, 11). According to Mahmood Mamdani (2007, 1) the politics of 
naming becomes particularly evident when comparing the case of post-2003 violence in 
Darfur with the US-led invasion of Iraq within that same year. Both cases produced roughly 
the same amount of deaths related to violence, yet the international community responded to 
the cases in different ways. While the violence in Iraq has been referred to as a case of 
insurgent and counter-insurgent violence, the violence in Darfur is called genocide. In the past 
two decades there has been much scholarly work on the usage of the word “genocide”. It has 
been found that the genocide label is rarely applied when the perpetrators are citizens of the 
US or its allies while the term has been used extensively when political enemies of the Unites 
States and its national interests commit murders (O’Connor 2012, 177). This politicized usage 
of the genocide label becomes particularly prone to misuses as we live in an age of heightened 
sensitivity to human rights abuses. With the 2002 entry into force of the ICC and the 2005 
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global political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) a broad group of 
governments was determined to take an active stance with respect to the most serious crimes 
in international law. Yet, as a result of these international efforts of human rights norm-
setting, all indictments of the ICC have been issued against Africans. In addition to the ICC’s 
one-sided selection of African cases, the court seems to carefully exclude Ugandan President 
Yoweri Musevi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Herman & Peterson 2010, 20). Despite 
a dismal human rights record, both African leaders have succeeded in avoiding condemnation 
as valuable clients of Western states (Reyntjens 2004, 177). It is even argued that “Kagame 
especially is an adored figure throughout much of the West … at home he plays host to 
visiting members of the global – and particularly the American – power elite” (Herman & 
Peterson 2010, 20). These politicized and partial practices have taken a toll on the credibility 
of the ICC in Africa.  
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Chapter 3. The Quest for an inter-African Jurisdiction: Looking Beyond the 
International Criminal Court versus Africa Debate 
 
This chapter discusses the grounds for the AU’s decision to give the African Court 
jurisdiction over international crimes. It is commonly assumed that the international fall-out 
over the warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir is 
the immediate factor that motivated the process of establishing an African Court with 
jurisdiction over international crimes (Abass 2013b, 28; Aja Agwu 2014, 40; du Plessis 2012, 
3; Murungu 2011, 3). The ICC Case Information Sheet on Al-Bashir states that the Sudanese 
President is “suspected of five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts of war, and 
three counts of genocide allegedly committed in Darfur, Sudan” (ICC Case Information Sheet 
2017). Due to international frictions the case against the president of Sudan and head of the 
National Congress Party has remained in the Pre-Trial stage. So far, the ICC has issued two 
warrants for arrest against Al-Bashir; the first in March 2009 and the second in July 2010. In 
response, AU Member States reaffirmed their opposition and argued that the case against Al-
Bashir would impair all efforts to find a peaceful solution to the conflict as the Government of 
Sudan displayed a continued willingness to support the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Sudan 
(UNAMID), which contributes to the halting of crimes against civilians (Ciampi 2008, 888). 
Considering this broadly-shared opposition, the AU has officially requested the UN Security 
Council to defer the proceedings against al-Bashir. In the midst of these international tensions, 
Al-Bashir has called for the establishment of an African court with jurisdiction over 
international crimes which “depends in its rulings on evidence and not on fabrications and 
political considerations” (Sudan Embassy 2017). 
However, this chapter will show that it would be inaccurate to assume that the AU’s call for 
an inter-African criminal jurisdiction is a direct aftereffect of the Al-Bashir fall-out. As will 
be shown in the following sections, the process of establishing an inter-African jurisdiction 
cannot be explained in the context of the ICC versus Africa debate alone. In fact, there are 
multiple grounds in support of an African regional court with jurisdiction over international 
crimes. In the following sections it will be argued that there is a historical and legal necessity 
for an inter-African jurisdiction to cover crimes distinct to and occurring on the continent. 
Given Africa’s post-colonial history and subsequent struggles for democratic consolidation, 
there seems to be a need for an African court with jurisdiction over international crimes 
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peculiar to the continent. In addition, AU member states have made commitments to the 
protection of human rights without establishing the legal tools to realize these aims. 
Furthermore, an over-reliance on Western-oriented human rights concepts and norms leaves 
smaller room for approaches from an African perspective and this might contribute to an ill-
fitted operationalization of human rights. With the Malabo Protocol, AU member states seek 
to improve upon the limitations of the ICC framework of universal jurisdiction with respect to 
region-specific human rights concerns.  
3.1 The Historical Quest for an Inter-African Jurisdiction: Democratic Consolidation and the 
Phenomenon of Unconstitutional Change of Government 
At the 8th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the States 
Parties adopted the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). 
With the ACDEG African states reinforced their commitment to the protection of democracy, 
good governance and the rule of law and human rights (ACDEG 2007, 1). The charter 
presents an important reaffirmation of African governments to cooperate and revitalize their 
efforts in combatting the democratic deficit and instability the continent is faced with. Since a 
democratic wave swept across the continent just a few decades ago, often referred to as the 
‘Third Wave’, many states have made the transition to a democratic state-structure. Beginning 
in 1989, the relatively young African states engaged in the build-up of formal democratic 
institutions such as political parties, a representative parliament and legal courts. However, 
formal institutions are only one of the many necessary steps to take towards a truly 
democratic state-system. In order for a successful democracy to be established there is a 
broader set of factors to take into consideration seeing that the success of democratic 
institutions cannot be guaranteed without necessary financial contributions for the active 
implementation and pursuit of democratic norms. African scholar J. Shola Omotala (2011, 7) 
argues that with the basic institutions of democracy in place, a process of political inclusion 
can be facilitated, however the African continent has witnessed the squander of democratic 
institutions by political actors that undermine the active pursuit of democratic norms to utilize 
and retain their power-positions. Hence, partly due to the absence of an active pursuit and 
implementation of democratic norms, institutional weakness and inefficiency has been widely 
documented. Institutional weakness and inefficiency seems to be an ongoing political 
headache on the African continent that holds the ever-present threat of eradicating the 
democratic gains that have been made so far.  
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According to data from the Polity IV project, published by the Center for Systemic Peace in 
2014, many African countries have progressed from having an autocratic government to 
having an anocratic government with the latter referring to a type of government that is in 
between an autocracy and a democracy. As can be seen in the line chart below, the total 
number of autocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a rapid decline in autocracies 
since the end of the Cold War in 1989 which paved the way for the Third Wave of 
democracy. From the year 2000 onward we can even witness a flatline in the number 
autocracies, indicating that the number of autocracies has decreased to a stable and fixed all-
time low. In contrast, ever since 1989 the number of democracies has greatly risen from an 
average of just below 5 to an average of around 15. While we can see an extensive 
improvement in the number of democracies, there have been some fluctuations in the period 
of 1989 - 2010, representing setbacks in the continuation of democratic regimes.  
 
 Source: Systemic Peace (2014) 
The number of anocratic regimes however, represent an even greater rise resulting in the 
establishment of many more African in-between regimes that now form the majority. What 
might be disconcerting, is the fact that the fluctuations in the period of 1989 – 2010 are 
stronger for the anocratic regimes. And more specifically, from 2008 onward there has been a 
small decline in democracies, and in return a modest upsurge in the number of anocracies. 
This could ultimately mean that, while there is some sort of consolidation of democracies to 
be witnessed, a relapse to a more autocratic regime is an ever-present and conceivable threat 
that cannot be overlooked. 
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Studies on democracy in Africa often speak of a long-term African challenge with respect to 
the consolidation of democratic governance, resulting in the recurring phenomenon of 
unconstitutional changes of government (Omotola 2011, 9; Schmitz 2006, 2; Sturman 2011, 
2). There are different shapes that unconstitutional changes of government can take; the 
illegal overthrow of a government by military or other opposition forces within the state-
apparatus (coup d’état), the suspension of term limits through illegal amendments of the 
constitution by sitting leaders, the assumption of power in the absence of transparent and fair 
elections or the refusal to accept an electoral defeat through the manipulation of elections or 
conduct of violence-backed resistance. Concerned about the phenomenon of unconstitutional 
changes of government,  the African region has worked on a set of common values and 
principles for democratic governance. With the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the 
framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government, African member 
states were early to express their grave concern about the resurgence of coup d’états on the 
continent and recognized that this phenomenon presents an alarming trend that negatively 
effects the ongoing process of democratization (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
2017). The Lomé Declaration is often seen as the first regional instrument used by the OAU 
for the development of procedures and sanctions that prohibit unconstitutional changes of 
government. Since the Lomé Declaration the African region has taken an increasingly active 
stance for the codification of regulatory norms and values against unconstitutional changes of 
government. Before the OAU would be replaced by the AU in 2002, Article 3 of the 
Constitutive Act of the AU (2000) had already provided a promise of continued regulation to 
combat unconstitutional changes of government. 
Despite the increase in regulatory norms and values, the phenomenon of unconstitutional 
changes of government has not been codified as a crime in international law. However, with 
Africa’s post-colonial history and subsequent struggles for democratic consolidation in mind, 
the AU’s decision to give the African Court jurisdiction over international crimes, including 
the crime of unconstitutional changes of government, falls into place. In this light, it would be 
inaccurate to assume that the AU’s call for an inter-African criminal jurisdiction is a direct 
aftereffect of the Al-Bashir fall-out. Instead, there has been a historical African desire to 
prosecute international crimes. According to Frans Viljoen (2004, 4) this desire was already 
present in the late 1970s when an African rights system began to take shape. The idea of an 
African Human Rights Court to redress human rights violations was proposed to the key 
drafters of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. One of the key drafters, Keba 
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M’Baye addressed the idea and argued that it would be too premature to establish an African 
Court that would redress human rights violations. However, according to M’Baye the idea 
was “no doubt, a good and useful one which could be introduced in the future by means of an 
additional protocol to the Charter” (M’Baye 1979, 1). 
3.2 The Legal Quest for an Inter-African Jurisdiction: The Case of Hissène Habré and the 
Need for an African Perspective in International Human Rights 
Ever since the establishment of the AU, the concept of human rights has truly gained 
momentum and became part of an expanded mandate for the active pursuit of human rights 
norms and rules. In this pursuit, AU member states have continuously reaffirmed their 
rejection of human rights violations and they have made commitments to answer a growing 
set of legal obligations that have been codified under the Constitutive Act of the AU and other 
treaties and legal documents. One of these legal obligations can be found in Article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act (2000) as it speaks of “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity”. Although these three crimes already fall under the 
universal jurisdiction of the ICC, AU member states feel a growing legal obligation to redress 
these grave violations within an African context. At present, the AU generates laws for crimes 
that cannot be prosecuted by its own regional court as it lacks the authority and required legal 
instruments. The omission of a regional court capable of prosecution became particularly 
evident in the international operation to bring Hissène Habré, the former President of Chad, to 
justice after allegations of crimes against humanity. The legal proceedings against Hissène 
Habré proved a legal necessity for an effective inter-African jurisdiction and formed a trigger 
for the AU’s decision to give the African Court jurisdiction over international crimes 
(Nmehielle 2014, 14).  
Hissène Habré has been the President of Chad from 1982 until he lost his presidency to 
Chad’s current head of state, Idriss Déby Itno, in 1990. After he lost his presidency, a broad 
group of Chadian citizens and Western governments held him responsible for serious human 
rights violations, causing Habré to flee to Senegal where he has been living in exile ever 
since. A campaign to bring Habré to trial started in 1991 with the set-up of a Chadian truth 
commission; the Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed 
by Ex-President Habré. One year after its establishment, the Commission of Inquiry published 
a report revealing that the Habré regime had been responsible for the deaths of 40.000 people 
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(Commission of Inquiry 1992, 91). The case drew widespread attention from international 
human rights organizations pressing for the continuation of investigations against the former 
President of Chad. Together with the Chadian victims international human rights 
organizations, including Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human 
Rights, formed the international committee for the Fair Trial of Hissène Habré. With the aim 
of prosecuting Habré while in exile, the International Committee turned to the preceding 
London arrest of the former dictator of Chile, Augusto Pinochet for inspiration (Brody 2015, 
210; Human Rights Watch 2017). One of the key elements in the Pinochet arrest has been the 
principle of universal jurisdiction, allowing for Pinochet to be brought to justice abroad. 
Inspired by the universal take on Pinochet’s case, Chadian victims filed a criminal complaint 
in Senegal against Habré (Brody 2015, 210). In February 2000, Senegalese Judge Djemba 
Kandji found that there was sufficient evidence to indict Habré on charges of torture and 
crimes against humanity and placed him under nominal house arrest in Senegal. The legal 
proceedings against Habré now represented a watershed moment in international justice as 
this would be the first time a country in the Global South would exercise universal 
jurisdiction.  
There were some lingering obstacles to the exercise of international jurisdiction by the Dakar 
Regional Court in Senegal. Jurisdiction over crimes that were committed abroad had not yet 
been established in Senegal. In order to establish international jurisdiction, the Chadian 
victims had to rely on the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). The convention was ratified by Senegal in 
1986 and presented the Dakar Regional Court with grounds for international jurisdiction over 
the crime of torture. However, the promise of a soon to be realized trial against Habré and the 
members of his government became seriously impaired as Habré’s lawyers and supporters 
worked to reverse the course of justice. Moreover, the newly-elected President of Senegal, 
Abdoulaye Wade, would have a negative political impact on the progression of the case with 
the appointment of Habré’s attorney, Madicke Niang, as a special advisor to the Senegalese 
government on judicial matters (Sansani 2001, 34). Following Habré indictment in February 
2000, Habré’s lawyers filed a motion to dismiss the prosecution for the reason that the 
UNCAT did not provide Senegalese courts with jurisdiction to try crimes that had been 
committed in Chad. Habré’s lawyers referred to Article 669 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
restricting Senegal’s jurisdiction over extraterritorial matters alike the Habré case. 
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On July 4, 2000, the Indicting Chamber dismissed the prosecution of Habré convinced that 
Senegal could not provide a suitable setting for the trial as the crimes had been committed in 
Chad (Brody 2015, 210; Sansani 2001, 34). However, the Chadian victims and their 
supporters were determined to bring Habré to justice and turned to Belgium to file a case. At 
that time Belgian courts had universal jurisdiction and wanted to prevent Habré from finding 
refuge in a country unsusceptible to Belgium’s extradition demands. Senegal however, was 
not pleased with the political interference with the judicial process and refused to meet 
Belgium’s extradition demands. Instead, Senegal turned to the AU for guidance on the affair. 
After a two-decade long process of inactivity on Senegal’s side, a persistent and strong lobby 
of Chadian victims and international pressures to extradite Habré to Belgium, Senegal and the 
AU set up the ‘Extraordinary African Chambers’ (Brody 2015, 213). The extraordinary 
chambers were established for the sole purpose of trying international crimes committed 
during the regime of Habré, including the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and torture. Due to the persistence of Chadian victims and with the involvement of the 
AU, the Habré case represents a first-time African approach to international criminal 
jurisdiction.  
It is often argued that the case of Hissène Habré paved the way to the idea of establishing an 
African Criminal Chamber (Murungu 2011, 15). At the time the international committee for 
the Fair Trial of Hissène Habré was formed, it also considered the African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice. However, the committee concluded that 
the regional African courts did not have universal jurisdiction and therefore could not host the 
trial against Habré. As a result, the Committee spoke of the necessity for an ‘African solution’ 
to serious crimes in international law and the headache of impunity (Habré Committee Report 
2006, 4). With future cases of similar nature in mind, the committee further proposed that the 
two regional courts were to merge in order for it to be granted universal jurisdiction over the 
most serious crimes in international law. Furthermore, the committee stated that “… there is 
room in the Rome Statute for such a development and that it would not be a duplication of the 
work of the International Criminal Court” (Habré Committee Report 2006, 5). Yet, the case of 
Habré proved the legal need for an impartial, African court, free from all forms of political 
pressure, in order to consolidate made commitments to the pursuit of human rights norms and 
rules and the rejection of impunity on the African continent. 
A proposal to establish an African court with jurisdiction over international and transnational 
crimes was first proposed in the 1980s during the drafting of the African Charter on Human 
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and Peoples’ rights (Amnesty International 2016, 7). However, the idea of an African court 
with criminal jurisdiction was too far ahead of its time and seemed like a premature ambition. 
The proposal did offer a vision for the future that gave room for an African perspective to 
international human rights practices. International human rights norms and concepts have 
historically been shaped by Western liberal societies (Aluko 1981, 234; Goonesekere 2013, 
1). The first global expressions of human rights concerns came in response to the devastating 
first World War. These first expressions were truly global in language and content. However, 
there is an ongoing debate among scholars on the modern concept of human rights as a 
Western notion (Cobbah 2005, 309; Wai 1979, 116; Donnelly 1982). The concept is 
increasingly criticized for supporting a Western political agenda with respect to societies of 
the Global South. Despite the increase in momentum of the global human rights agenda in 
Africa,  there seems to be a gap in the literature when it comes to approaches to human rights 
from an African perspective (Cobbah 2005, 309). With the Malabo Protocol, the AU’s call for 
an inter-African criminal jurisdiction has the potential to fill this gap. Hereby, the yet-to-be 
established court is not meant to replace or undermine the activities of the ICC. But instead, it 
provides an opportunity to complement the practice of international law of today while 
bringing an African approach to African problems with respect to universal jurisdiction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Conclusion  
There are several important insights that follow from the in-depth analysis presented above. 
The AU has proved to be an ambitious driving force for change in the continent’s human 
rights landscape. In the pursuit of its ambitions, the call for an inter-African jurisdiction seems 
to have grown on par with an increase in tensions between African states and the ICC. As this 
study has shown, the increase in tensions is a result of different factors, most notably the 
disproportionate selectivity in ICC jurisdiction with respect to the African region. the far-
reaching universal jurisdiction of the ICC has never produced an investigation or prosecution 
outside of Africa. In the global world power matters and states with the most power find 
themselves in a position where they can undermine the court and limit its reach. This became 
particularly evident in the case of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The case involved the 
engagement of Western officials in war crimes who were in breach of international law, yet a 
formal investigation never materialized. Despite the ICC’s uncomplicated personality on 
paper, we witness that the practice of universal jurisdiction is often exercised by developed 
states at the expense of African countries. The ICC prosecutions of African leaders such as 
Gbagbo and al-Bashir have impaired the prestige of the ICC as an impartial and independent 
court. Prosecutorial selectivity in the case of Côte d’Ivoire refrains the ICC from exercising an 
exhaustive, all-encompassing investigation that attempts to fully understand the complexity of 
the context in which the conflict and the roles that different actors herein play. This results in 
an unbalanced exercise of universal jurisdiction leaving current Ivorian President Oattara in a 
state of impunity. In addition to an observable selective approach to investigations and 
prosecutions, the case of Sudan has found that the genocide label has been used in a 
politicized manner that resulted in accusations of genocide against Sudanese President al-
Bashir even though the ‘ingredient of genocidal intent’ remained questionable. In light of 
these concerns, these cases of increased frustration with ICC activities have undoubtedly been 
a catalyst for the AU’s call for an inter-African jurisdiction. 
However, this study has argued that the Malabo Protocol and new regional developments in 
African human rights law should also be explained beyond the ICC versus Africa debate. 
While the motivations for an inter-African jurisdiction seem to have grown on par with an 
increase of anti-ICC sentiment we should be careful not to view the Malabo Protocol as a pure 
anti-ICC move on behalf of the AU. Instead, with Africa’s post-colonial history and 
consequential problems with democratic consolidation in mind, the African call for 
jurisdiction over international crimes can be understood as more than a means to defy the ICC 
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and taint its global prestige. The case of Hissène Habré further underlines a legal need for the 
African region to tackle lingering obstacles to the regional practice of international criminal 
jurisdiction and to consolidate made commitments to the pursuit of human rights norms and 
rules. A regional court with international criminal jurisdiction will provide Africa with 
abundant opportunities to bring a long-missing African approach to international human rights 
and find solutions to crimes that are specific to the African continent, such as the alarming 
trend of unconstitutional change of government. Hereby, the African court is not meant to 
substitute or impede on the practices of the ICC. But instead, it provides an opportunity to 
complement international developments in human rights law while fulfilling the African quest 
for an inter-African jurisdiction. 
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